Stephen H. Haber

Pays :États-Unis
Langue :anglais
Note :
Professeur d'histoire à Stanford University, Californie, USA (en 1989)
ISNI :ISNI 0000 0001 1020 9359

Ses activités

Éditeur scientifique3 documents

  • How Latin America fell behind

    essays on the economic histories of Brazil and Mexico, 1800-1914

    Description matérielle : VIII-315 p.
    Description : Note : Bibliogr. en fin de chapitres. Index
    Édition : Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford university press , 1997

    [catalogue][https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37535237x]
  • The Mexican economy, 1870-1930

    essays on the economic history of institutions, revolution and growth

    Description matérielle : XVII-348 p.
    Description : Note : Notes bibliogr. Index
    Édition : Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford University press , cop. 2002
    Éditeur scientifique : Jeffrey Lawrence Bortz (1945-....)

    [catalogue][https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb38909669t]
  • Political institutions and financial development

    Description matérielle : 1 vol. (IX-304 p.)
    Édition : Stanford : Stanford university press , impr. 2008
    Éditeur scientifique : Douglass Cecil North, Barry R. Weingast (1952-....)

    [catalogue][https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb41344114w]

Auteur du texte2 documents

  • Fragile by design

    the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit

    Description matérielle : 1 vol. (xi-570 p.)
    Description : Note : Bibliogr. p. 507-548. Index
    Abstract : "Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries, but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households. Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents due to unforeseen circumstances. Rather, these fluctuations result from the complex bargains made between politicians, bankers, bank shareholders, depositors, debtors, and taxpayers. The well-being of banking systems depends on the abilities of political institutions to balance and limit how coalitions of these various groups influence government regulations. Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why some endure while others are undermined, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues." Publisher's description
    Édition : Princeton (N.J.) : Princeton university press , cop. 2014
    Autre auteur du texte : Charles W. Calomiris

    [catalogue][https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb438877476]
  • Industry and underdevelopment

    the industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940

    Description matérielle : XIV-237 p.
    Description : Note : Bibliogr. p. 217-229. Index
    Édition : Stanford (Calif.) : Stanford university press , 1989

    [catalogue][https://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37433965f]

Pages dans data.bnf.fr

Auteurs reliés

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Sources et références

Voir dans le catalogue général de la BnF

Sources de la notice

  • Industry and underdevelopment : the industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940 / Stephen H. Haber, 1989
  • LCNA (CD OCLC), 1994-06

Pages équivalentes